Abstract-A statistical database (SDB) is a database that is used to provide statistical information (such as average, sums etc.), derived from the records, to user queries for statistical data analysis. Sometimes, by correlating enough statistics, protected data about an individual can be inferred. The security problem is to limit the use of the SDB such that only statistical information is available and no protected individual data can be obtained from the available queries. When users are able to infer protected information in the SDB from responses to queries, the SDB is said to be compromised. The goal is to maximize the number of available queries without compromise. One of the natural restrictions for the prevention of database compromise is to allow only SUM queries, that is, only certain sums of individual records are available for the users. In this paper we discuss security problems for databases where only SUM queries with certain constraints are allowed. Assume there are n numeric records {z1, . . . , zn} stored in a database. The problem is to find the largest number of subset sums of {z1, . . . , zn} (maybe with some other constraints) that can be disclosed such that none of numbers zi (or even sums of small subsets) can be determined from these sums. Some tight bounds for this number (under certain constraints on size and dimension of query subsets) are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problems of statistical database (SDB) security have been of growing concern in recent years [4] [5] [6] , [8] [9] [10] . The goal of statistical databases is to provide statistical information about groups of individuals (for research purposes) while protecting their privacy. Examples of confidential information stored in SDB might be salaries or data concerning to the medical history of individuals. Sometimes, by correlating enough statistics, confidential data about an individual can be inferred.
A statistical database is said to be secure if no protected data can be inferred from the available queries. When users are able to infer protected information in the SDB from responses to queries, the SDB is said to be compromised. The security problem of SDB is to provide simple and rich summary statistics about protected information in the SDB while preventing compromise. For more information and relations to other fields see [5] , [7] , [8] .
As an example consider a company N with n employees. Suppose that for each member of N is recorded the sex, age, rank, length of her/his employment with N , salary etc. The salaries {z 1 , . . . , z n } of the individual employees are confidential. Suppose that only SUM queries are allowed, i.e. the sum of the salaries of the specified people is returned. For example one might pose the query: What is the sum of salaries for males above 50, working with N during the last 10 years? How large can be the number of allowed SUM queries, preventing compromise ( i.e. no individual salary z i can be inferred using the outcomes from the list of allowed SUM queries)?
This question was originally raised by Chin and Ozsoyoglu [5] who introduced a statistical database control mechanism called the AUDIT EXPERT for prevention of database compromise with SUM queries.
In general, let z 1 , . . . , z n be nonzero real numbers which are n confidential records stored in a database. Let Given nonzero real numbers a 1 , . . . , a n , determine the maximum possible number of subsets with a zero sum. That is, determine the maximum number of (0,1)-solutions of the equation
The maximum number of answerable SUM queries without compromise is n n/2 .
(ii) (Griggs [9] ) The maximum assumed for
is unique up to permutations of the coordinates.
In his excellent survey paper [8] Griggs proposed several fundamental models of database compromise. The models introduced in [8] : group-security, internalsecurity, relative-security lead to challenging number theoretic, geometric and combinatorial problems. For other models and related problems see [4] , [9] .
In the model called group-security model, not only individual data but also subset sums of subsets I ⊂ [n] with small size, say 0 < |I| ≤ g, must be protected. This is equivalent to the following problem.
Problem 1.
Determine the maximum number G(n, g) of (0,1)-solutions of equation (I.1) provided there are no nonzero solutions of Hamming weight less than g + 1.
In other words G(n, g) is the maximum number of (0,1)-vectors of an (n − 1)-dimensional subspase (of R n ) not containing a (0,1)-vector of weight less than g + 1.
Thus Problem 1 can be viewed as a coding problem. Namely, we seek for finding a largest binary code C ⊂ {0, 1}
n ⊂ R n , of length n and the minimum (nonzero) Hamming weight at least g+1,
n . Let us call this code an R-linear (n, g) code.
Problem 2. (with size restriction on inquired subset).
Assume now that the number of elements in the SUM queries are restricted by the size constraint: only sums of m (or at most m) elements are considered. In this case the problem is equivalent to finding the maximal number of (0,1)-solutions of weight m (or Problem 2 * : weight not exceeding m) of equation (I.1), provided there are no (nonzero) solutions of weight less than g + 1. We denote this number by G(n, m, g) (resp. G(n, ≤ m, g)). [6] 
Theorem 2. (Demetrovich et al
In fact, the equality in (i) holds for all n > m. This was earlier shown in [2] (in terms of forbidden weights in hyperplanes of R n ).
Let us consider the following more general problem, which clearly makes sense theoretically and hopefully also practically.
Problem 3.
Under similar restrictions as in Problems 1,2 determine or estimate the maximal number of (0,1)-solutions of a linear equation
where A is a real r × n matrix of rank r.
In particular, for integers 1 ≤ g, k ≤ n let G k (n, g) denote the maximum number of (0,1)-solutions of equation (1.2) such that rank(A) = n − k, provided there are no solutions of the weight g or less. Equivalently,
Clearly the set of SUM queries (with the characteristic vectors) corresponding to these solutions does not lead to g-group compromise.
As a motivation for study of Problem 3 let us also mention the notion of internal security introduced in [8] . Griggs [9] observed that the maximum number of SUM queries avoiding h-inside compromise equals the maximum number of (0, 1)-solutions of equation (I.2) with h = r and every h columns of A are linearly independent. Note that in the case when A is a matrix (of rank r) without zero columns then a coalition of h−1 members, 1 ≤ h ≤ r − 1, can infer at most n − r + h protected records.
The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how useful for applications is the subject called Extremal Problems under Dimension Constraints which was introduced by Ahlswede et al. in [1] and studied in a series of papers (also mentioned in [1] ). Quite surprisingly, the results presented below are direct consequences of results in [1] or can be easily derived using methods and tools from that paper.
II. MAIN RESULTS
The next result is a generalization of Theorem 1.
Moreover the optimal construction is unique up to the permutations of the coordinates.
Note that in case k = n − 1 we have G(n, 1) = n n/2 . Next we extend Theorem 2 to arbitrary g. Given n, m, w ∈ N let F (n, m, w) denote the maximum number of (0,1)-vectors X ⊂ R n of weight m such that the span(X) does not contain (0,1)-vectors of weight w. In [2] F (n, m, w) is determined for all parameters w < k ≤ n. In particular, note that finding of F (n, m, 1) is equivalent to Problem 2 in case g = 1.
Similarly define the function F (n, w) where again vectors of weight w are forbidden but we have no restriction on the weights of (0,1)-vectors (the unrestricted case). Results for this case are presented in [3] . Clearly F (n, m, g) ≥ G(n, m, g) and F (n, g) ≥  G(n, g) . Surprisingly the following is also true.
Lemma 4. For integers 1 ≤ g < m ≤ n we have  F (n, m, 1) = F (n, m, g) = G(n, m, g ).
Note that F (n, g) = G(n, g). For example, it is easy to observe that F (n, n − 1) ≥ 2 n−2 while G(n, n − 1) = 1.
The optimal set of SUM queries corresponds to the set of (0,1)-solutions of weight m of equation
and is unique up to the permutations of the elements. The set of SUM queries corresponds to the set of (0,1)-solutions of equation (1.1) with a 1 = . . . = a l = 2, a l+1 = . . . = a n = −1.
Theorem 7.
(i) For n = gk + r with g ≥ 2 and 0 ≤ r < k we have
(ii) For n > 2g we have 1 2 G k (n, 1) < G k (n, g) ≤ G k (n, 1).
